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As information technology permeates healthcare (particularly provider-facing systems), maximizing sys-
tem effectiveness requires the ability to document and analyze tricky or troublesome usage scenarios.
However, real-world health IT systems are typically replete with privacy-sensitive data regarding
patients, diagnoses, clinicians, and EMR user interface details; instrumentation for screen capture
(capturing and recording the scenario depicted on the screen) needs to respect these privacy constraints.
Furthermore, real-world health IT systems are typically composed of modules from many sources, mis-
sion-critical and often closed-source; any instrumentation for screen capture can rely neither on access to
structured output nor access to software internals.
In this paper, we present a tool to help solve this problem: a system that combines keyboard video
mouse (KVM) capture with automatic text redaction (and interactively selectable unredaction) to produce
precise technical content that can enrich stakeholder communications and improve end-user inﬂuence
on system evolution. KVM-based capture makes our system both application-independent and OS-inde-
pendent because it eliminates software-interface dependencies on capture targets. Using a corpus of EMR
screenshots, we present empirical measurements of redaction effectiveness and processing latency to
demonstrate system performances. We discuss how these techniques can translate into instrumentation
systems that improve real-world health IT deployments.
 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Medical enterprises large and small are replacing paper-based
systems with IT-based ones, and upgrading old, piecemeal IT-based
systems with new, federated ones. However, as with any large
engineering project, it is unlikely that the ﬁrst solution produced
and deployed is exactly right. Standard engineering tenets teach
the importance of ‘‘closing the loop’’; but to do so by understand-
ing and tuning a system requires measuring it, in order for this tun-
ing to be a data-driven process.
However, when it comes to health IT systems, even the process
of just taking such measurements raises a combination of
challenges:Privacy Preservation In a human-facing IT system, screenshots
comprise the natural domain for measurement. However, in
health IT, screenshots are full of privacy-sensitive material.
First, we have the obvious issues: names and identifying infor-
mation of patients, images of patients, text regarding diagnoses
and medication and other treatments. But there are more subtle
issues as well, such as names of providers, details of health IT
user interfaces protected by vendor agreements, and non-text
indicators (such as ‘‘warning’’ icons) that can betray conﬁden-
tial patient details.
A measurement methodology needs to respect these privacy
constraints—either by putting cumbersome mechanisms in
place to ensure that private data is never leaked throughout
the analysis process, or by redacting it in the ﬁrst place.
Context Preservation Traditional work on privacy and conﬁ-
dentiality seeks to hide information. However, to fulﬁll their
purpose of tuning and analysis, redacted health IT screenshots
still need to contain information—a blacked-out screen would
preserve all privacy, but be useless. We need to balance hiding
of privacy-protected information with communication of work-
ﬂow process context. Our redaction system needs to be effective
both at removing sensitive information, but also at retaining (in
conjunction with end-user feedback) the system behavior infor-
mation we were trying to measure in the ﬁrst place.
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ther their medical mission, within the constraints of various
business objectives.
A measurement methodology needs to respect these deploy-
ment constraints—it cannot make assumptions about underly-
ing applications, operating systems, access to source code,
access to structured protocol communications, even access to
documentation. Furthermore, a measurement methodology
cannot disrupt the underlying system; besides impeding enter-
prise mission, changes might also (depending on the system)
invalidate necessary certiﬁcation.
Workﬂow Impact For clinicians using health IT systems, the
primary motivation is helping patients rather than wrestling
with computing systems, even to document troublesome sce-
narios in order to enable these systems to be ﬁxed. Conse-
quently, a measurement methodology needs to minimize the
work required and delay experienced by these users: it should
work automatically and quickly; users should be able to quickly
log some issue and move on with their real mission.
This Paper. This paper reports on our research addressing this
aspect of ‘‘closing the loop’’: designing, prototyping, and evaluating
technology to enable redaction of privacy-sensitive elements in
medical IT (privacy preservation), while preserving usage context
and permitting interactively selected unredaction (context preser-
vation), passively acting on raw screen data alone (system impact),
and operating automatically in real time (workﬂow impact). Draw-
ing on algorithmic techniques that have been used for various as-
pects of image processing, our work is, to the best of our
knowledge, the ﬁrst to explore these techniques in the context of
automatic redaction of privacy information in health IT (or other
domains).
Section 2 motivates this work in the context of closing the loop
for health IT usability research and development. Section 3 pro-
vides an overview of our prototype system. Section 4 describes
our methodologies for text redaction. Section 5 describes the
broader system we built around these techniques. Section 6 evalu-
ates the effectiveness of our approaches. Section 7 presents how
this work can impact real-world health IT systems. Section 8 re-
views related work, and Section 9 concludes.2 We upgraded to OS X 10.6 midway through development and analysis.2. Health IT motivation
In concurrent work [1], our lab has been cataloging many ways
in which clinicians report that health IT systems lead to usability
frustration. We list just a few examples:
 The age ﬁeld for a patient does not allow ﬁne enough units to
correctly determine medication for newborns—or allow a way
to indicate age of patients still in utero.
 A health IT screen with ﬁeld-deﬁned data did not allow an expe-
rienced clinician to record ‘‘smell of breath.’’
 A drop-down menu did not permit easy discovery of the proper
diagnosis, leading the clinician to pick a wrong one that was at
least ‘‘close.’’
 The interface to refer a patient to a stomach cancer specialist
requires the non-specialist clinician to ﬁrst identify which of
52 varieties of stomach cancer the patient has.
 A health IT system gives each pending lab result an identical
title, ‘‘Lab Result.’’
 A medication administration system does not recognize that an
order for ‘‘10mgs’’ of a medication can be fulﬁlled by two 5 mg
tablets.
 An EMR screen gives three ways to exit—whose consequences
differ substantially but which appear the same to the user.Each such scenario demonstrates the need for ‘‘closing the
loop.’’ The very existence of this litany of problems indicates that
the learned experts who built these health IT systems, even with
the best of foresight and stakeholder input, fail to anticipate usabil-
ity problems that arise in the ﬁeld. Furthermore, each such prob-
lem is likely solvable. For some; small software changes likely
sufﬁce; others may require experimental evaluation of proposed
solutions or research into new techniques.
However, before developers can try these small changes or
external researchers can explore new techniques, they need to
know about these problems. Unfortunately, current state of the
art does not permit the frustrated health IT user to easily capture
and document these problems. Photographing or printing the
screens violates privacy (both of patients and of providers). Instru-
menting the internals of the health IT software requires access to
code that is usually proprietary—and then requires modifying mis-
sion-critical systems. Often, researchers (such as the ﬁrst author)
cannot even look at usage logs of the system, due to restrictions
of the university IRB. Just recording oral complaints does not per-
mit easy reproduction of scenarios—and (as the second author
found) other clinicians at the same institution may even disbelieve
the scenario ever even existed.
A system such as ours—which empowers end-users to record
and annotate screenshots automatically redacted of sensitive
information without changing the internals of the health IT system
being passively monitored—would provide a key component in a
solution to systematically alleviate these usability frustrations.
We revisit this vision in Section 7.2.3. System overview
Again, in this work we explore a core problem in closing the
loop: screencapture of health IT meeting the privacy and logistical
requirements outlined in Section 1. Our prototype system applies
text and image redaction to KVM feeds from health IT systems—
see Fig. 1.
Our system includes functionality essential to implementing
screen capture for sensitive health IT systems. The basic steps of
instrumenting such systems include screen capture, image pro-
cessing and editing, and data sharing. After capture, the system
processes an image to ﬁnd and redact text. Additionally, the sys-
tem may search for regions within the image that match a set of
image snippets or ‘‘templates’’ and count, redact, or unredact
matching regions. Finally, a user may wish to edit the image and
further redact or unredact a portion of the processed screenshot.
Implementation. The bulk of our system implementation relies
on a mixture of C and C++ code spanning multiple open-source li-
braries and custom-developed libraries and applications, including
boost [2], C++ STL [3], OpenCV [4], liblinear [5], and CGAL [6–8].
Altogether, we implemented approximately 9000 lines of code.
To remain system-independent, we implemented certain func-
tionality with higher-level APIs; our development environment is
a MacBook Pro running OS X 10.5 with 8 GB of memory.2 Certain
low-level OpenCV routines rely on system libraries, but these are
transparent to our code—OpenCV is cross-platform.
Screen Capture. Our system relies on a virtual network computer
(VNC) arrangement to capture screen material from a remote host
[9]. In a nutshell, VNC deﬁnes a protocol for transporting a com-
puter’s framebuffer, keyboard, and mouse data over the network.
By building a system with this protocol, our system can capture
and operate on all KVM events in a system-independent fashion.
In our test conﬁguration, Mac OS X 10.6 functions as the ‘‘Capture
System’’ and the application x11vnc [10] running on an Ubuntu
Fig. 1. Our measurement module passively listens to keyboard and mouse input and video output—and consequently remains system-independent and accommodates
closed, mission-critical, and/or certiﬁed health IT systems.
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‘‘Capture Target.’’ The client implements read-only functionality
and therefore does not pass keyboard/mouse events from the
VNC client to the VNC server.
Our client connects to the VNC server using TCP. After connect-
ing, the endpoints proceed through a handshake phase and negoti-
ate the protocol version ‘‘RFB 003.008nn’’ and the ‘‘raw’’ pixel
format to transfer screen updates from the server to the client
without compression.4. Text redaction approaches
Text redaction is a fundamental aspect of the system because it
removes sensitive text from screen capture data, relieving the end-
user from manually redacting screen captures before sharing. By
default, our approach implemented a ‘‘deny-all’’ policy and thus
redacts all text it ﬁnds. An end-user can then ‘‘unredact’’ small
regions as necessary to facilitate their conversation. Because redac-
tion affects just text and a small number of icons, our intention is
that overall screen context remains despite removal of potentially
sensitive data.
In a different approach to redaction, our system could simply
redact an entire screen (e.g., turn the entire screen black) and the
end-user could unredact whichever small piece supports their
needs. We believe this approach provides too little screen context
to observers, and would require too much work from end-users.
Unredacted, unsensitive screen data provides context to applica-
tion stakeholders that may help focus their discussion.
Image-based text redaction consists of two principal steps: (a)
ﬁnding text in an image (also known as text segmentation), and
then (b) recoloring segmented image regions to ‘‘remove’’ text.
(We note that such segmentation is also the ﬁrst step of optical
character recognition—OCR.) Redacting images using this approach
ensures that no ‘‘hidden’’ text or other data exists within the ﬁnal
redacted product (as often plagues redaction in standard ofﬁce
document formats).
For automatic text redaction, we explored two approaches:
Canny Edge Detection [12], which aims to bound text with boxes,
and Gabor-wavelet ﬁltering [13], which aims to classify individual
pixels as ‘‘text’’ or ‘‘non-text.’’ For Gabor, we looked at both unsu-
pervised classiﬁcation and supervised classiﬁcation [14]. (Table 2,
at the end of our discussion, summarizes these techniques.)4.1. Canny edge detection
In order to be legible, screenshot text exists with an intensity
contrast in relation to its background and thus creates gradient
high points. The Canny approach analyzes an image’s intensitygradient and marks edges at gradient high points—thus (in theory)
segmenting screenshot text.
First, we convert a color screenshot to 8-bit gray scale. We then
apply a Gaussian blur using a 3  3 window to reduce image
noise—Canny output qualitatively contained less noise with this
initial blurring step. Next, we executed Canny using low and high
threshold values of 100 and 300 respectively to ﬁnd edges—the
values provide qualitatively-reasonable redaction results for a vari-
ety of desktop screenshots. Gradient magnitudes greater than the
high threshold are considered edges and traced throughout the im-
age. Values above the low threshold denote edges that branch from
an existing trace process. Together, these tunable values reduce
noise during edge detection. After executing the Canny algorithm,
we ﬁnd connected components (polygons) using Canny output and
an algorithm suitable for doing so [15]. For each polygon discov-
ered, we compute a bounding rectangle and draw a ﬁlled version
of the rectangle into an image ‘‘redaction mask.’’ Finally, we apply
the redaction mask to the original image to produce a redacted
image.
Fig. 2–4 show examples from our prototype. Unfortunately,
standard practice in commercial health IT prevents customers from
disclosing user interface details (e.g., [16]), so we cannot show the
original screenshots used in our experiments, but rather use a rep-
resentative open-source one. In terms of complexity, this sample
would fall at the minimum of our test corpus (Section 6)—e.g., at
the bottom left of Fig. 9a.
4.2. Gabor ﬁlters
In general, a wavelet is a wave with some orientation and fre-
quency that, when convolved with an image, resonates and creates
a detectable signal. Gabor wavelets, which are commonly used in
image processing, are comprised of a sine wave modulated by a
Gaussian envelope; for our application, they use a two-dimen-
sional envelope. Both real and imaginary components comprise
the wavelet, but we follow the model of Jain and Bhattarchee
[14] and only use the real, symmetric (cosine) component. When
an individual ﬁlter is convolved with an image, our system extrap-
olates border pixels to increase the image size and prevent the ﬁl-
ter from ‘‘falling off’’ the image edge (other extrapolation
approaches failed in our experiments).
Using a bank of ﬁlters enables detection of image features of dif-
ferent frequencies and orientations. In the wavelets we used in our
application, we considered ﬁve standard deviations of the Gaussian
(again following Jain and Bhattarchee). This left us two tunable
parameters for wavelet functions: wavelength (k) and orientation
(h). For orientation, we followed Jain and Bhattarchee and chose
h 2 f0:0;45:0;90:0;135:0g
Fig. 2. In this paper, we use this sample screenshot from http://www.open-emr.org to demonstrate our techniques in the context of a realistic health IT system—as we are
prevented from disclosing the proprietary screenshots from our test corpus from real EMRs. In terms of complexity, this sample would fall at the absolute minimum of our
corpus—e.g., at the bottom left of the top Fig. 9a.
Fig. 3. This image depicts the rectangles that result from processing Fig. 2 with Canny edge detection, polygon detection, and polygon bounding with rectangles. Note tiny
rectangles enclosed within larger ones—as well as spuriously large rectangles containing the entire screen.
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wavelength, we chose powers of two
k 2 f:5;1:0;2:0;4:0;8:0;16:0;32:0g:
in order to span a collection of feature sizes. When we ran this on a
collection of our screenshot, we found it was effective at detecting
the relevant features.
Feature Vectors. We apply a Gabor wavelet ﬁlter by ﬁrst con-
volving the image with this wavelet function.
If we have a bank of n ﬁlters, we then have n ﬁltered images,
yielding (after thresholding) an n-dimensional vector for each pixel
in the image. We then append each pixel’s x and y position to each
vector, and shift each vector to zero mean and unit standard devi-
ation. Thus, applying a bank of n ﬁlters yields an n + 2-dimensional
feature vector for each pixel.4.3. Classiﬁcation
Once we have used our bank of Gabor ﬁlters to turn each pixel
into a feature vector, we then need to determine which vectors
represent text pixels and which represent non-text.
Unsupervised Classiﬁcation. In our ﬁrst approach, we use the k-
means algorithm [17] to cluster features into k classes, where
k 2 {2,3}. The algorithm assigns each pixel a class label
i 2 [0,k  1], where one class may correspond to text if text exists.
Jain and Bhatterjee [14] clustered into three classes for text analy-
sis; we started with that, but found that some screenshots clus-
tered better visually into k = 2 classes.
During k-means clustering, the system relied on stopping con-
ditions of the ﬁrst of 10,000 iterations or an error rate of .0001.
We chose the initial cluster centers using a more recent technique
Fig. 4. This image derives using the ﬁlled Canny-detected rectangles (Fig. 3) as a redaction mask to the original image (Fig. 2). Canny missed some true edges throughout the
image (false negatives for edge detection) and added edges where text does not exist near the icons on the left. Canny also added whitespace between words. (We ﬁrst
eliminated the all-enclosing rectangles from Fig. 3; otherwise, the entire image would have been redacted!)
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fore assigning labels. After running k-means, the label i corre-
sponding to text must be chosen manually. The designated ‘‘text’’
pixels form a mask that redacts text when combined with the ori-
ginal image.
Supervised Classiﬁcation. The downside to unsupervised classiﬁ-
cation is multi-fold: k and i are chosen manually; the approach
classiﬁes pixels into k clusters whether or not text exists; and k-
means clustering can be slow (particularly with a feature count
easily surpassing one million with modern screen resolutions).
To address these issues, we also tried supervised classiﬁcation.
Instead of using k-means, we feed each feature vector to a trained
classiﬁer that labels the pixel as ‘‘text’’ or ‘‘not text.’’ All pixels la-
beled as ‘‘text’’ are converted to the color black; all other pixels
maintain their values.
We chose a linear support vector machine (SVM) to label pixels as
members of classes {1,1}.
We experimented with two classiﬁers: (a) L1-regularized L2-
loss support vector classiﬁcation and (b) L1-regularized logistic
regression. We chose these classiﬁers because after training, they
can contain a 0-valued parameter for each feature that remained
unused during the training process. Such features can be elimi-
nated from input during future predictions and thus not computed
in the ﬁrst place. Their absence reduces computational overhead in
the running system. (Interestingly, in our tests with EMR screen-
shots, only one feature was not used).
To begin machine learning, we ﬁrst partition our set of screen-
shots into a training set and testing set. Then to train the classiﬁer,
we generate a set of ground-truth feature vectors and labels from
the training set. We generate ground-truth by manually choosing
the features and labels associated with ‘‘best’’ redaction results
using the unsupervised classiﬁcation technique described above.
This ground-truth is fed into a program we implemented that
interfaces with the liblinear library [5] to train and save the resul-
tant classiﬁer. The classiﬁer can then be run on any image using
another program we wrote to classify pixels as {1,1} and thus re-
dact text.
During the SVM training process, we used default liblinear val-
ues for all SVM parameters. We experimented with cross-valida-
tion to tune the constant C in the SVM expression (see liblinear
for details [5]). However, we experienced minimal performance
improvements and therefore relied on default values to train each
classiﬁer.5. Experimental tools
Section 4 above described our approaches to automatic text
redaction. However, for both clinicians as well as system experi-
menters, it is important to keep users in the loop. This present sec-
tion describes two tools we built for this purpose.
5.1. Tool: scrubs
Our scrubs tool (Fig. 5) captures and redacts screenshot images
dynamically, in real time, using Canny. Our prototype uses x11vnc
[10], pthreads [19] and the RFB protocol [9].
When a health IT user decides some sequence of activity should
be logged for later analysis, it is possible that automatic redaction
may remove too much information (such as non-sensitive text that
would help illuminate the issue requiring analysis) or too little
(such as a sensitive logo or image). Consequently, our scrubs tool
also provides an edit mode, which pauses display of screen updates
and allows the user to click and drag the mouse to deﬁne custom
redaction and/or unredaction rectangles (Fig. 6). While paused
for user edits, the system continually processes and maintains re-
ceived screen updates in the background, and upon returning to re-
cord mode, the system displays a compilation of all updates
processed during pause.
5.2. Tool: ﬁve_in_one
The Canny Edge approach to text redaction (Section 4.1) over-
lays a screenshot image with rectangles marking regions of poten-
tial text. In our experiments on EMR screenshots, we found that the
resulting set of rectangles could often beneﬁt from additional mas-
saging. Thus, for the purpose of exploration and for end-user use,
we developed a tool called ‘‘ﬁve_in_one’’ (Fig. 7). This tool permits
a wide range of interactive operations, including merging, copying
and deleting rectangles; toggling display between transparent and
solid rectangles; generating (and then automatically applying)
redaction templates; overlaying with a grid; and thinning out
redundant rectangles. Fig. 8 shows one example.
6. Evaluation
To evaluate our system, we looked at the relative effectiveness
of the two approaches to automatic redaction (Sections 6.1 and
Fig. 5. Our scrubs tool enables automatic redaction, interactively tunable, in real time.
Fig. 6. Our scrubs tool automatically applies redaction, and then permits custom redaction and unredaction.
Fig. 7. Our ﬁve_in_one tool enables experiments and end users to analyze and edit the rectangular regions of potential text ﬂagged by Canny redaction, and to generate and
apply templates.
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We also looked at effectiveness of context preservation (Sec-
tion 6.4), as well as basic computational costs (Section 6.5). Sec-
tion 6.6 summarizes.
For our empirical analysis, we used a corpus of 80 screenshots
from EMR systems at two large healthcare providers. As we noted
earlier, although the datasets contain fake patient data, the donor
organizations still considered the details sensitive, so we cannot
publicly show them. In one dataset, images were in PNG format,
RGB color, and were approximately 1500  1900 pixels and 1–
1.5 MB each. In another, images were also PNG and RGB, but
1680  1080 pixels and 230–390 KB. Due to their sensitive nature,
we stored the corpus in an AES-encrypted disk volume.
Fig. 9 illustrates the complexity of the datasets according to
the number of redaction rectangles generated for each
screenshot.6.1. Canny
Our testing showed that Canny-based text redaction requires
improvements before the system can apply it meaningfully to
health IT datasets, such as the EMR screenshots we used.
The Canny approach had several problems. It generated redac-
tion rectangles that cover large parts of the screen, thus reducing
potentially useful, non-private screenshot context. (Occasionally,
Canny even redacted the entire screen!) The Canny approach also
sometimes found interior edges of letters such as ‘‘p’’ which pro-
duce very small rectangles embedded in larger ones. Canny left
whitespace between words, which may enable word-based
frequency analysis that reveals redacted text. Canny also tended
to miss some text (false negatives) while redacting some non-text
(false positives). For example, Fig. 3 shows false negative and
spuriously large rectangle issues; Fig. 10 shows false negative
Fig. 8. As one example of ﬁve_in_one editing, a user can clean up the redaction rectangles produced by Canny by ﬁrst thinning out superﬂuous rectangles and then enlarging
the remaining rectangles one pixel at a time.
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issues.
Our analysis did suggest ways that Canny redaction could be
tuned tobeusable for this application. As Fig. 11 shows,Wecan elim-Fig. 10. Canny redaction on a gminate rectangles that cover all or most of the screen, and rectangles
that contain a large number of the other rectangles. As Fig. 12 shows,
we can also identify (and then merge) rectangles that are close en-
ough vertically to be considered on the same ‘‘text line,’’ but whose
horizontal gap is small enough to be considered whitespace.
Manual editing with our ﬁve_in_one tool can reduce the rectan-
gle count by 75%, in samples from our corpus. Reducing rectangle
count can reduce the latency of subsequent processing steps that
involve all Canny rectangles, such as rendering rectangles in an im-
age or analyzing and merging adjacent words.6.2. Gabor
Visually, Gabor-ﬁltering redacts more precisely than Canny-
based ﬁltering. Unlike the Canny-based approach, Gabor ﬁlls
whitespace between words and redacts fractional characters. Ga-
bor also redacts fewer non-text objects (such icons and logos)
and did not erroneously redact large rectangles from the screen-
shot, as Canny-based redaction did.
Qualitative Analysis. Fig. 13 revisits Fig. 2 using Gabor-based
redaction where k = 2 and i = 0. In Fig. 13, note how Gabor-based
redaction ﬁlls whitespace between words in sentences but does
not redact objects such as the full icons. It does not redact large
rectangles from the screen as Canny-based redaction. However,
as Fig. 14 shows, Gabor will occasionally fail to redact text with
certain font scales and textures.
Quantitative Analysis for Unsupervised. To evaluate unsupervised
Gabor redaction, we chose a few representative but dissimilar
(using the metric we present below, in Section 6.4) screenshots
from dataset 1. For each screenshot, we chose the unsupervised
redaction that looked best qualitatively, and then manually
counted the text characters missed by redaction. In these
screenshots, the character counts ranged from 1094 to 2145. False
negatives (characters entirely unredacted) ranged from 0.036% toail inbox shows missed text.
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unredacted) ranged from 1.7% to 4.3%. We did not count false pos-
itives because they represent non-characters, and would require
counting pixels to be meaningful.
Quantitative Analysis for Supervised. As Section 4.3 above dis-
cussed, we started by running unsupervised Gabor on dataset 1
and, for each screenshot, choosing the ‘‘best’’ screenshots manu-
ally, considering the various output classes of the redaction pro-
cess, including partial false negatives. (Section 7.2.2 and Fig. 7.5
in the ﬁrst author’s thesis [20] contain more information on this
process.) We then used these labels to train the L1-regularized lo-
gistic regression classiﬁer on dataset 1. To evaluate supervised Ga-
bor classiﬁcation, we then applied this trained classiﬁer to dataset
2, and compared the results against the ‘‘ground truth’’ obtained by
running our unsupervised Gabor variations on each screenshot and
manually choosing the best one (See Fig. 15.).
The mean classiﬁcation performance is 95.2% with a stddev of
.953% and a minimum performance value of 93.2% (larger minimaare better than smaller ones). The mean false-negative rate is .307%
with a stddev of .338% and a maximum value of 1.4% (smaller max-
ima are better than larger ones).6.3. Non-text information leakage
Our experiments also revealed ways in which redacted health IT
screenshots still revealed possibly sensitive information. The posi-
tioning of redacted text within a page can betray information, as
can similarities and differences between successive lines of re-
dacted text. A tick-box with a redacted ‘‘checkmark’’ is still distin-
guishable from unchecked box; visual ‘‘alerts’’ such as red
exclamation points or yellow-highlighted text also convey poten-
tially sensitive information.
To address these concerns, we explored techniques to normal-
ize redaction rectangles against a background grid, to identify
and redact speciﬁc icon templates, and to identify and redact spe-
Fig. 13. This image shows Gabor-based redaction on the OpenEMR screenshot from Fig. 2. Gabor preserves more structure of objects such as the icons and horizontal lines,
connects whitespace between words in sentences, and (although not shown here) redacts fractional characters at the edge of a screenshot.
Fig. 14. Gabor-based redaction can leave text partially unredacted, and miss text altogether, as this example from a Wikimedia Commons EMR image shows.
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information.)
6.4. Context preservation
As the introduction noted, traditional approaches to privacy and
conﬁdentiality seek to hide information. However, for our health IT
screenshot capture tool to be useful, we also need to preserve
information: the context of the health IT screenshot involved.
To quantitatively evaluate how well our techniques work at
preserving context, we looked at two ways of measuring differen-
tiating information between pairs of redacted screenshots (using
unsupervised Gabor).
In the ﬁrst approach, we measured the fraction of overlapping
text-redacted pixels in an image pair. With this metric, changes
accumulate only when a pair of pixels exist, at least one pixel of
the pair begins non-black, and both pixels are redacted. When
one or both pixels begin non-black and the pixels correspond to
text, redaction removes differentiating information by converting
both values to black. Removing information reduces differentiating
screenshot context. Taken to the limit, redaction blackens each
screenshot entirely and leaves no differentiating information.
Looking at all pairs of screenshots in dataset 1, the mean frac-
tion of overlapping, redacted text is 9.3% with a standard deviation
of 3.5%; for pairs of identical screenshots, 23.7% and 3.6%. Redac-
tion preserves 90% of differentiating information in all pairs and
76% in pairs of identical screenshots—on average, redaction affects
no more than 24% of the pixels in any screenshot.
In our second approach, we computed a distance between two
screenshots by counting the number of pixels that match within
the pair. Because our health IT screenshots are nearly identical in
size and aligned in content (e.g., items such as menus are not pix-
el-shifted among screenshots) this measurement gives a notion ofsimilarity that enables useful pairwise-screenshot comparisons (as
we qualitatively validated). Fig. 16 shows the results of text redac-
tion in similarity of over 1275 screenshot pairs of dataset 1 (we ex-
cluded pairs of identical screenshots). Overall, redaction has little
impact on pairwise screenshot similarity with changes ranging
from 2% to 15%. Text redaction retains potentially important con-
text in the health IT screenshots.
6.5. Latency
The principal computational component of our system con-
sisted of text redaction.
To measure latency of text redaction, we used a MacBook Pro
running Mac OS X 10.7 with 8 GB of memory serves as the exper-
imental platform. An AES-256-encrypted disk image stores image,
feature, and label ﬁles associated with redaction. To obtain timing
information, we used dtrace and programmatically printed timing
information. All ﬁle loads were measured using a cold ﬁle cache.
Table 1 shows the results.
6.6. Summary
Table 2 summarizes the two techniques we evaluated for auto-
matic redaction in health IT screenshots. Overall, supervised Gabor
seems the best immediate candidate. However, in future work, it
would be interesting to explore a hybrid approach: ﬁrst, applying
fast Canny-based reduction; then using the merging and ﬁltering
heuristics from Section 6.1 to reduce the number of superﬂuous
rectangles; then applying supervised Gabor redaction over a ran-
dom sampling of pixels from each redaction rectangle to eliminate
false-positives—as a lack of Gabor-detected text would let us auto-
matically discard the redaction rectangle. After this, we would
merge whitespace. As a result, we may be able to increase Canny’s
01
fra
ct
io
n
screenshot
0 25
overall  performance:
text not text
re
da
ct
ed
no
t
re
da
ct
ed
true
positive
false
positive
false
negative
true
negative
Fig. 15. Effectiveness of Gabor-based text redaction. We trained a liblinear L1-regularized logistic regression classiﬁer on dataset 1 and applied it to dataset 2; in both cases,
we used the qualitatively best unsupervised Gabor redaction as ‘‘ground truth’’ labeling.
More similar
Less similar
pair number
-0.02
 0
 0.02
 0.04
 0.06
 0.08
 0.1
 0.12
 0.14
 0.16
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 im
ag
e 
pi
xe
ls
ch
an
ge
d 
m
at
ch
in
g 
st
at
us
 0  200  400  600  800  1000  1200
Fig. 16. Effect of text redaction on similarity of pairs of distinct screenshots in dataset 1. Fractions that fall above the horizontal line correspond to screenshots that are more
similar after redaction.
730 J. Cooley, S. Smith / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 46 (2013) 721–733sensitivity threshold to redact lower-contrast text while maintain-
ing a low false positive rate.7. Improving real-world health IT systems
We designed our system within the context of a larger vision: a
privacy-protected ‘‘Redaction Service’’ that interacts with a moni-
tored health IT system, a ‘‘Sharing Service’’ that functions as a
repository for application stakeholders to share redacted screen-
shots, the health IT system itself with developers and maintainers,
and an end-user who desires their system to be monitored and a
web-browser through which the end-user can interact with redac-
tion and sharing services. Fig. 17 illustrates this vision.7.1. The pieces
Our current prototype implements screen capture and text
redaction. For roll-out in medical enterprises, one would need toTable 1
Our measured costs of redaction.
Mean Stddev
Latency to classify pixels (s)
Canny 0.096 0.009
Unsup. Gabor 2.077 0.722
Sup. Gabor 2.077 0.017
Latency to generate elements for 28 Gabor ﬁlters (s)
Set up 0.365 0.004
Build 13.12 0.181
Normalize 4.569 0.033
Latency to load Gabor elements from ﬁle on disk (s)
Features 5.987 0.407
Labels 0.226 0.069add the system components to support sharing of data—and to
support end-user annotation (both graphical—circles and ar-
rows—and text). One would also need to expand the currently lim-
ited UI with more easy-to-use affordances such as drop-down
menus.
On a lower level, potential future work could also explore trying
ways to improve on the core Gabor and Canny techniques.
For example, currently, we follow the standard practice of tun-
ing Gabor parameters heuristically by starting with a parameter set
that worked for others and hand-tuning variables until the system
provides ‘‘useful’’ results. Dunn and Higgins propose a systematic
method to select the parameters based on decision theory and
assuming the images have only two textures of interest [21]; Wel-
don proposes a systematic approach based on minimizing pre-
dicted error [22]. Adapting one these of approaches might reduce
the need for heuristics while still providing good results.
We could perhaps improve computational efﬁciency of Gabor
by applying the concept of steerable ﬁlters developed by Freeman
and Adelson [23]; two steerable ﬁlters could replace four Gabor
orientations and therefore reduce the overall ﬁlterbank size by
one half.
In our experiments, we used Canny to detect the edges of the
text regions. Researchers such as Atae-Allah et al. [24] and Bar-
ranco et al. [25] propose using Jensen-Shannon divergence as an
alternative technique to detect edges; it would be interesting to
apply that technique in our setting.
(Sections 9.2 and 9.3 in the ﬁrst author’s thesis [20] contain
longer discussion of technical extensions to this work.)7.2. Health IT usability
In Section 2, we discuss a few of the many real-world scenarios
we have identiﬁed where health IT users experience frustration.
Table 2
Summary of redaction techniques.
Canny Finds edges Fast Many errors;
requires tuning
Gabor Finds texture Slow More accurate
Unsupervised: requires
human judgment
Supervised: requires
training set
Fig. 17. Our system within the context of a larger vision. The ﬁgure includes a
‘‘Redaction Service’’ that interacts with the monitored heath IT system, a ‘‘Sharing
Service’’ that functions as a repository for application stakeholders to share
redacted screenshots, a monitored health IT system, an end-user who wish their
system to be monitored and a web-browser through which the end-user can
interact with redaction and sharing services. Within this big-picture context,
internal components of the bold box labeled ‘‘Redaction Service’’ deﬁne the
contribution of this work. A sample usage scenario follows the numerical labels in
the following steps. (1) An administrator enables the ‘‘Redaction Service.’’ (2) An
end-user triggers the ‘‘Redaction Service’’ to log a monitored host. (3) The
‘‘Redaction Service’’ connects to the monitored host and begins logging, with
automatic redaction. (4) The end-user interacts with monitored health IT system.
(5) The end-user reviews and possibly edits logged data. (6) The end-user publishes
redacted screenshots.
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frustration, she simply presses a button to generate a redacted
screenshot of the scenario in question. Either at that point, or later
in the day, she can then use our tools to touch up the image (e.g.,
by unredacting text that needs to be visible) and annotate it, to ex-
plain the issue:
 ‘‘See, these lab results all have the same title—useless!’’
 ‘‘This initial dropdown menu does not contain the right
diagnosis.’’
 ‘‘The system should recognize that two 5 mg pills equals one
10 mg pill, in this case!’’
 ‘‘I don’t know which type of stomach cancer; that’s why I’m
referring the patient to a specialist.’’
We now have a record—already scrubbed of IRB-sensitive mate-
rial—which can propagate onto developers, IT managers, and
usability researchers.
With established feedback paths, such stakeholders can begin
to understand empirically the day-to-day, system-effects of their
decisions.
A simple capture system can also provide direct value to end-
users by endowing them with a larger, empirical role in the soft-
ware maintenance cycle. They can capture, annotate, and shareproblems, conﬁgurations, ideas, bugs, and other captured scenarios
with stakeholders. They can inform existing ad hoc stakeholder
interactions such as online support forums and help-desk interac-
tions with rich, contextual data. Additionally, end-users can use
traces as visual web search keys during their own investigations.
Playing a larger role in the software maintenance cycle can
motivate end-users to share their ﬁndings continually: if end-users
believe and experience that their contributions make a positive dif-
ference to their workﬂow, end-users may be motivated to contrib-
ute further. Consequently, organizations may improve empirical
insight into their information security systems and associated risk
calculations. When organizations lack the expertise to analyze
traces in-house, they could hire third parties to do so.8. Related work
Our work combines existing technologies of screen capture and
computer vision with a goal of improving the quality of communi-
cations among application stakeholders and ultimately, improving
our understanding of ‘‘usable security’’. Many research and com-
mercial products explore complementary tasks; Fig. 18 sketches
this space.
GUI tools. The MIT Sikuli research project combines computer
vision and programming to enable users to create machine-inde-
pendent, visually-programmed and actuated programs [26]. A
commercial product call eggPlant also allows developers to test
GUIs with machine-independent, automation scripts [27]. Many
screen capture applications such as Snipping Tool [28], Snapz Pro
X [29], and xwd [30] exist. Some programs capture still screen-
shots, others capture both stills and video, and some allow end-
users to annotate captures. Google’s in-house UseTube [31] sup-
ports employees who wish to perform user studies of any net-
work-connected computer; it simpliﬁes the act of performing,
archiving, and accessing user studies.
Interactive graphics and image tools. Many commercial and free-
software tools such as Gimp [32], Photoshop [33], Aperture [34], Fi-
nal Cut Studio [35], Pixelmator [36], and Imagemagick [37] allow
one to paint, create, touch up, and modify still images and/or video.
These applications could be used to manually redact text from a
screenshot. Google Goggles can extract and recognize text from
natural scenery for purposes such as language translation among
many others [38]. The scope of our system is limited to computer
screenshots. However, screenshots taken with a camera may in-
clude angles and lighting similar to the natural scenery submitted
to Google Goggles.
Data de-identiﬁcation. In the medical domain, a large body of
work relates to deidentifying protected health information (PHI)
in electronic documents once it is already in text format [39,40].
Deidentiﬁed data records can still contain visual information that
reveals sensitive data. Research in the context of databases that
contain a mix of sensitive and unsensitive records explored the
concepts k-anonymity [41] and l-diversity [42].
In some circumstances, redacted text in our system may suffer
from a visual form of the k-anonymity problem; these techniques
may apply in our setting.
Document Analysis. Document redaction products such as Rapid
Redact [43] and brava! [44] exist in the commercial marketplace.
These products parse document structure and can help users
achieve WYSIWYG. In contrast, our system redacts material from
images directly (rather than relying on textual metadata).
The International Conference on Document Analysis and Recog-
nition (ICDAR) has many papers and competitions related to the
problem applying machine learning and computer vision to ana-
lyze documents [45]. A 2003 competition sponsored by ICDAR
has datasets available for optical character recognition (OCR), word
Fig. 18. Sketch of classes of data and tools which act on them. Our work explores
automatic discovery and then redaction of text on otherwise ﬂat screenshots.
732 J. Cooley, S. Smith / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 46 (2013) 721–733recognition, text locating, and other purposes [46]. These datasets
do not apply directly to our problem; we segment text, in some
cases have a more constrained segmentation problem, and do not
apply OCR.
Text segmentation. Our work builds on existing text segmenta-
tion research [14] to redact text automatically from screenshots.
9. Conclusion
Effective usability engineering in any system requires closing
the loop, so users can easily identify and communicate trouble-
some scenarios. In an interactive electronic system, a natural way
to do this is via screenshots. In health IT, privacy concerns require
that any such screenshots have sensitive data redacted and the
logistics of real-world health IT require that any solution not touch
the internals of the software.
To address these concerns, we have designed, built, described,
and empirically analyzed a system that allows end-users to take
screen captures on sensitive systems. The system automatically re-
dacts screenshot text and allows end-users to ﬁne-tune redacted
results for their needs. The automated redaction process requires
no end-user intervention. We evaluated our system using a corpus
of screenshots from EMR systems at two large medical facilities.
Now that we have established that this core redaction step is
feasible, the next step would be incorporating it in the larger vision
of Fig. 17 and deploying the system in a real user environment. Po-
tential areas for other future work include improving Canny for
general-purpose use, implementing predicate matching to process
screenshots according to logical conditions, and building a larger
ground-truth data corpus.
Ultimately, our redaction system can facilitate data-driven
communications among application stakeholders and guide sys-
tem evolution to address stakeholder needs. With accurate and
timely tuning enabled by our work, stakeholders can achieve and
maintain usable and secure health IT systems in practice.
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